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diversity among women, women are oppressed as women by patriarchal structures such as rape,
pornography, and sexual harassment that regulate women’s sexuality and construct women as
beings whose main role is to service men’s needs.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Sojourner Truth's famous speech “Ar’n’t I a Woman?” has always intrigued me because
it attempts to unify white and black women by appealing to something that they all share because
they are women.1 Truth does not explain what the common feature that all women share is, but
she implies that a person’s biological capacity to birth children is a possible candidate when she
asked, “And how came Jesus into the world? Through God who created him and woman who
bore him.”2 Like Truth, many people have tried to unify different groups of women by
describing them in terms of features or experiences that all women share because they are
women.
This sort of project has typically resulted in essentialism, which is the idea that certain
features or experiences are necessarily constitutive of members of a group. Many feminist
theorists, especially the “essentialist critics,”3 have resisted any such project for defining women
because features that have been thought to be “essential” to women have also been central to
their oppression. For example, historically women were thought to be intellectually inferior to
men and thus were denied many educational opportunities. Another example might be a
description of women as being “closer” to nature because they physically give birth to children.
This characterization may be used to argue that, as a result of their being necessarily closer to
nature than men, women ought to be the primary caregivers for children.
The aforementioned examples are not the sort that the essentialist critics find particularly
problematic. Rather, their focus is on essentialist problems within feminism. Patriarchal
essentialist concepts are disturbing, but those within feminism are even more worrisome. Since
1

Sojourner Truth, “Ar’n’t I a Woman,” Theorizing Feminisms, ed. Elizabeth Hackett and Sally Haslanger (New
York: Oxford UP, 2006), 113.
2
Ibid., 113.
3
The central theorists I discuss who criticize essentialist accounts (as given by feminists and non-feminists) are bell
hooks, Maria Lugones, and Elizabeth Spelman.
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women typically have been (mis)defined by essentialist accounts, one might assume that
feminists would be among the least likely group to make the mistake of asserting that some
feature or experience is constitutive of or characteristic of women. But, in fact, many feminists
have made this mistake when attempting to depict women’s oppression or describe women’s
interests. Specifically, some feminists have treated the situation and interests of white middleclass women as representative of all women. Such feminists have overlooked the interests of
other women and made problematic authoritative claims about what a “woman” is and what
issues should concern her.
The diversity of women’s interests and experiences has led some feminists to question
whether a non-essentialist description of women's interests can be given. The essentialist
critique in feminist theory represents an intentional inward focusing on the content, purpose, and
direction of feminism. Essentialist critics challenge feminists to theorize in a way that does not
make any feature or experience constitutive of all women when the said feature (or experience)
only applies to particular groups of women. However, the danger of the essentialist critique is
that the task of identifying a feature or experience that all women share may be impossible, or it
may even be that the project is nonsensical. Elizabeth Spelman describes the danger as such:
“For essentialism invites me to take what I understand to be true of me ‘as a woman’ for some
golden nugget of womaness all women have as women; and it makes the participation of other
women inessential to the production of the story. How lovely: the many turn out to be one, and
the one that they are is me.”4 Spelman’s statement may lead to the cynical conclusion that a
feminist cannot talk about women in a way that unifies them or represents all of them. If what it
means for someone to be a woman differs between women or if the subject of feminism is

4

Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman (Boston: Beacon Press.1988), 159.
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unknowable or unstable, then the essentialist critique may undermine the possibility of any
meaningful discourse about women. Without a stable subject, some aspects of feminist theory
may need to be seriously revamped, and if there is no knowable subject for feminist theory, it
will likely have little import in the lives of individuals or in advancing social change.
Despite worries raised by the essentialism critique, I will argue that feminists can engage in
meaningful discourse about women, and I will argue that the discourse will be politically useful for
eradicating gender oppression. I will frame this conversation in terms of a concept of woman that
focuses on how women are oppressed as women. In the aforementioned statement, Spelman
questions whether one woman can possibly give a representative statement of what it means to be
a woman, but my approach will not proceed in that manner. However, I am interested in
universality—is there something distinctive that affects or applies to all women simply because
they are women? My main project is to delineate a universal way to talk about women that will
adequately represent the experiences and interests all women have because they are women. A
concept of woman will describe what features identify a person as a woman, and it can be used to
better understand the oppression that women experience.
My motivation for formulating a concept of woman stems from the daunting nature of
gender oppression. Because the problem is intricate and thorny, it is easy to lose sight of the big
picture: women are systematically oppressed. Marilyn Frye uses the analogy of a birdcage to
illustrate the problem of oppression: if we focus too carefully on an individual wire it will become
unclear to us why the bird cannot step around the wire to escape. Single wires do not appear
problematic until we step back and observe the way in which the wires work in conjunction with
other wires to cage in the bird. Then, Frye asserts, "it is perfectly obvious that the bird is
surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least
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hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid
walls of a dungeon."5 Frye's analogy is extremely helpful in understanding why a concept of
woman is philosophically significant. As mentioned previously, the essentialism critique could
lead to the implication that theorizing about women is not a meaningful task. Recall Spelman’s
quote—she implies that any concept of woman will be rooted only in a formulation about one
woman. However, this direction implies that feminist theory focuses solely on individual women.
In only focusing on the differences between individuals and the challenges that arise from women's
diversity, feminism could lose sight of the big picture—how the wires of the birdcage connect to
form a system of oppression that cages women. A concept of woman will help steer away from an
eliminitivist-like attitude about women toward a perspective that appreciates the diversity among
women while also accounting for and challenging the systemic oppression women face.
In the second chapter, I will demonstrate why worries that stem from the essentialism
critique raise questions about the possibility of having a concept of woman that does not make
essentialist claims. In the third chapter, I will reject postmodernism’s answer to the problem of
essentialism. In the fourth chapter, I will formulate a concept of woman in a meaningful way that
is valuable for feminist theory and does not fall prey to potential essentialist challenges. Even with
diversity among women’s experiences, women are oppressed as women by constructions that
strongly determine the ways that people think about being/treating women. Patriarchal institutions
such as pornography, rape, and sexual harassment regulate women’s sexuality and construct
women as beings whose main role is to service men’s needs. No matter how privileged a woman
may be due to other aspects of her identity, she is always subject to practices that subordinate her
to men because she is a woman—a being constructed in a certain way by the dominant patriarchal
5

Marilyn Frye, “Oppression,” in Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology. ed. Ann E. Cudd and Robin O.
Andreasen. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 86. Emphasis original.
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culture. Although women are oppressed in other ways as well, such as being persons who are
designated as the primary caregivers for dependents, in this paper I specifically focus on how
women’s sexuality is regulated by patriarchal institutions.
I will explain the concept of woman as being broader or more inclusive than some have
thought it to be because my account allows for males to function as women in certain situations.
In discussing a concept of woman, I first examine the situations of women to see if they share
any features or experiences. At this point, “women” are persons that we would commonly refer
to as women who, roughly speaking, we could say are females. The features identified with
females, namely certain physiological features, are taken to signify that a person is a woman,
although in some cases the features are perceived as being present when in fact they are not.
While women do not seem necessarily to share any particular feature or experience, they
will be candidates to be treated or molded into certain kinds of beings by patriarchal institutions.
These patriarchal institutions put forth a normative view of what women should be—creatures in
the service of men—and compel females (and some males in some instances) to conform to
standards that place them in a subordinate role to men. The stereotypical fashion magazine
demonstrates common behavior norms forced on women, for instance, to be truly beautiful for a
man, one must be slim. The experiences of a woman (continue to read “woman” roughly as
female) are shaped by the regulatory role oppressive institutions play in their lives. However, in
presenting a view of how women ought to be, the normative view of woman created by the
institutions can apply to males who function in a subordinate role to men. As a result, the
entities that will fit into a concept of woman are not necessarily restricted to being females; the
concept may include some males as well.

5

The shape of the project will change from examining the lives of women (what an
ordinary language user would call a woman) to analyzing how patriarchal institutions define
what women are and should be (persons in the service of men). Women in the second sense may
still have and be perceived as having physiological features typical of females because certain
features, such as those associated with reproduction, have been connected with being subordinate
to men. The majority of the second chapter will focus on women understood in the first sense,
while the fourth chapter will mainly concern women in the second sense of the term. I will
conclude the paper by giving a concept of woman, understanding women as beings that have
been created for men by patriarchal institutions. Though this second move gives a more robust
social understanding of women, it is an insufficient ending point for feminism. Nevertheless,
looking at how patriarchal institutions create women provides feminists with a ground for social
criticism. Patriarchal institutions universalize oppressive norms for women’s behavior, and all
women will have certain interests pertaining to how they have been negatively constructed
because they are perceived in a certain way. Since feminists work to eradicate gender
oppression, they can use the concept of woman that I will offer to highlight the problematic ways
in which women (at this point, we should read “women” as the beings whose behavior is
systemically regulated by the patriarchal institutions) are affected by oppressive institutions. In
turn, feminists can debunk the patriarchal institutions, which will allow for the formulation of a
feminist concept of woman in which what it means to be a woman is not defined in terms of
men’s interests. Although I will not formulate a feminist concept of woman in this present work,
I will posit certain interests women have as women that stem from the oppression they have
suffered and ways in which feminists can use a concept of woman that views women through
how their sexuality has been regulated.

6

To summarize, I will use “concept of woman” in two main ways. First, a concept of
woman will refer to the beings that most people refer to when they think of women. This first
use roughly refers to females. Second, I will shift my meaning of a concept of woman to focus
on how patriarchal institutions create women, and I will take “women” to be the persons that are
relegated to roles that service men and are defined by men’s interests. Most often these
individuals will be females, but it is not the case that only females will fit into these roles. I do
not mean to suggest that the concept of woman is scalar, although it certainly lends itself to that
understanding, because I do not want to imply that a person can be more of less of a woman.
Any person who is relegated to the role of a woman is a woman. Some people will fit into these
roles more often than others. A male who is feminized through rape does not necessarily
become a woman for the rest of his life, but females will generally fit into these roles more often.
Because a person may not always be a woman does not mean that she is less of a woman.
Instead, it means that the concept of woman does not have fixed referents; people may or may
not function as women in different situations. The point I want to emphasize is that because
women are created as being a certain way by outside institutions, their agency is undermined. As
a result, women will have shared interests that relate to eliminating their role of servicing men.
The second chapter will mainly utilize the first understanding of a concept of woman, and the
fourth chapter will mainly utilize the second.
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Chapter Two: Defining the Problem of Essentialism
There are at least two interrelated ways of unpacking the heart of the essentialist critique;
one I will call the Overlooking problem and the second I will call the Authority problem. These
problems occur when a theorist defines a group of people by wrongly attributing to them a
constitutive feature, and the problems concern normative claims about what it means to be a
woman and what issues women ought to care about as women. The Overlooking problem occurs
when feminists, in focusing on the interests of white, heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied
women, ignore the concerns of women of color, poor women, and other women (e.g., lesbians,
disabled women, et cetera). The Authority problem occurs when women with more power
dictate and define what the interests of women are, and as a result, silence the voices of other
women.6 In this section, “women” refers to what ordinary language users would identify as
women, namely beings with female physiological parts, and a concept of woman refers to
finding a feature or experience that all women share.
I. The Overlooking Problem
bell hooks criticizes the origins of feminist theory, claiming that it has “never emerged
from women who are most victimized by sexist oppression; women who are daily beaten down,
mentally, physically, and spiritually—women who are powerless to change their condition in
life.”7 To support this claim, hooks cites Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, in which
Friedan conflates the condition of all women with the condition of middle class white women
who wished to hold full-time careers rather than be stay-at-home wives/mothers. However, as
hooks’ quote indicates, white middle class women, although discriminated against along gender

6

Sally Haslanger has a related discussion of these problems, which she terms the “Commonality” and “Normativity”
problems. See Sally Haslanger, “Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?” Noûs 34.1
(2000): 37.
7
bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 1-2.
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lines, are privileged with respect to their economic status and their race. Because of privileged
aspects of their identities, middle class white women had a greater voice with which to speak out
against their oppression and their experiences were thus discussed more often than the
experiences of women of color, poor women, or lesbians. When white middle class women
wrote about the concept of woman, they ignored situations and interests of other women. While
the overlooking of some women was not necessarily intentional, white middle class women
presumed their situations represented the situations of all women.8
II. The Authority Problem
Although related, the Authority problem is more subtle and complicated than the
Overlooking problem because it deals with who is (or which groups of women are) allowed to
speak authoritatively for the interests of different women. Although Friedan focused on the
experiences and issues particular to women in her position, she made claims about all women.
Friedan limited the scope of her arguments to certain types of experiences, which implied that
these issues should be the focal point for feminist theory. In speaking authoritatively about
women, Friedan meant for the content of her critique to be representative of women as such, but
her approach defined "woman" and "women's oppression" in a certain way, and her definitions
did not always match the experiences of other women. If someone uses to the term “woman,”
then the term refers to all women and should indicate something true about them; however,
Friedan’s use of the word did not. By not restricting the content her claim to a certain group of
women, Friedan’s use of the term “woman” wrongly left out some groups of women, which in
turn silenced the voices of these women. If someone were to identify women based on Friedan’s
8

Whether or not Friedan actually gave an account of women that failed to be representative of women as such is not
important for the uses of this paper. Rather, since it is plausible that reasonable persons could interpret Friedan as
giving an unrepresentative account, this interpretation of her work serves as an instance of the type of problems
identified by the essentialist critique. In this paper, when I refer to the claims made by Friedan, I specifically refer
to the interpretation of her claims as making unrepresentative statements about women.

9

concept of woman, it is highly possible that only white middle class women might be recognized
as being women. The absence of other groups of women entailed that their concerns do not
count as legitimate concerns of women.
Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman shed some light on why women’s voices are
silenced when other women misuse universal terms:
You theorize about women and we are women, so you understand yourselves to be
theorizing about us and we understand you to be theorizing about us. Yet none of the
feminist theories developed so far seem to me to help Hispanas in the articulation of our
experiences. . . . We do not recognize ourselves in these theories.9
When the Hispanas hear feminists make universal claims that do not represent their experiences,
they may question whether they are actual women—they feel fragmented between various
interests that may correspond to their identity (as Hispanic women). Lugones and Spelman
describe this line of thinking as creating a “schizophrenic split” between women’s interests as
women and their interests as determined by other aspects of a woman’s identity. Take, for
instance, an African-American mother who works low-paying service jobs to support her
children and who wishes to spend more time with them. If she hears feminists devalue the role
of mothers and the role of the stay at home mother, then the black mother will likely feel isolated
from the feminists’ message—she desires to stay home with her children, but instead she works
multiple jobs to feed them. If feminism is supposed to empower and benefit women, then it is
not accomplishing its goal if women feel isolated from its claims. For feminism to be effective,
women should identify with its message, or at least feel that it has some positive import in their
lives. However, the single mother feels pulled towards opposing sides—is she less of a woman
for wanting to stay home? Is she not a real woman for not desiring to leave her family for a

9

Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural
Imperialism and the Demand for ‘the Woman’s Voice,” 576. The quote should be read in an Hispana’s voice.
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high-paying career, if she had the opportunity? She experiences the isolating and bewildering
fragmentation of self that Lugones and Spelman describe. Furthermore, the isolation compounds
on the alienation she already experiences as a member of one or more oppressed groups, and she
is “paralyzed into a state of displacement with no place to go.”10 Cut off from a group of which
she is supposed to be a member, the black mother is left without a platform from which she can
speak of her experiences and interests. If the experiences of other women do not count as the
experiences of women as given by an essentialist description, then these women are left without
a voice to speak about their interests as women.
In addition to the problem of silenced voices, there is a dilemma with who gets included
in the process of defining women and women's oppression. According to hooks, some women
speak about there being a “common oppression,” but the women with power (for hooks, white,
middle-class, heterosexual women) define what constitutes oppression, and their definitions
mostly focus on the concerns of the women in power rather than other women. hooks accuses
women with power of speaking about white, upper-middle class, heterosexual women instead of
women as such. While white women have not tried to understand the plight of women of color,
they do try to tell black women what feminism should be to them.11 Lugones and Spelman
highlight a similar problem: the dominant patriarchal culture does not demand that white women
share in the culture and experiences of women of color, but women of color are forced to
participate in the dominant culture. For instance, white culture is dominant in America in that its
norms are implicit in our social structure, and deviations from those norms are viewed as
aberrant. Simply by living in America, people of color are forced to encounter and often comply
with white cultural norms. Thus, women of color have an understanding of white women’s
10
11

Ibid., 576.
hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center, 11.
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situations that white women in turn do not have about women of color.12 It is problematic for
white women to make authoritative claims about what other women should care about when they
have inadequate knowledge of other women’s experiences and since the experiences of other
women are so distinct. By distinct, I mean that women’s experiences and the other aspects of
their identities affect each woman’s personal experience of womanhood. Return to the example
of the poor African-American mother and compare her situation to that of a well-off white
woman who may be frustrated with how she has been defined in terms providing care for her
children. Whereas the poorer black woman may be frustrated by how she has to work multiple
low-income service jobs to provide for her children and would like to have the opportunity to
have better paying jobs so she could send more time with her family, the wealthier white mother
wants her work to be defined in terms other than caretaking. Although both women are
concerned with work, their experiences of work and how they desire to relate to work diverge.
In discussing the relationship between white women and women of color, Lugones and
Spelman present a complicated view of feminist cooperation: “I do not think that you [white
women] have an obligation to understand us [women of color]. You do have an obligation to
abandon your imperialism, your universal claims, your reduction of us to your selves simply
because they [the imperialistic, universal, reductionist claims] seriously harm us”13 (Lugones and
Spelman do suggest that women can work together on theory if done through friendship and
trust). When Lugones and Spelman claim that white women do not have an obligation to
understand women of color, they are not saying that it is acceptable for white women to continue
making authoritative claims about other women. Instead, Lugones and Spelman suggest that
complete understanding between women of different ethnic groups is impossible.
12

Lugones and Spelman, “Have We Got a Theory for You!” 576.
Ibid., 576.
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One might read Lugones and Spelman as suggesting that giving a concept of woman is
impossible because of problems with making authoritative claims about other women; perhaps
working cooperatively with each other is the best women can do because white women will
never fully know and truly understand the experiences of women of color. Lugones and Spelman
imply this reading in their discussion of the difficulties of translating experiences across
language barriers. When a woman frames her understanding of herself, either verbally or
conceptually, she works in her own language and in the cultural concepts particular to her
society. Some aspect or nuance is always missed/misrepresented/misunderstood through the
process of translation. Translation is a specific barrier, but more generally, it seems that
complete understanding between groups of women may be impossible because of possible
epistemic barriers. Even though I, as a heterosexual woman, may lobby for the lesbian rights, I
do not have first-person access to what it means to be a lesbian. Although I can imagine the
situations of lesbians, I have not experienced their situations in the relevant sense. If first-person
access to experiences is necessary for the pertinent kind of knowledge that Lugones and Spelman
suggest, then it seems like different groups women cannot understand each other. Thus, women
will not be able to make claims that appropriately represent all women. The problem is not
simply that women of color have been ignored, but that any attempts made by a white woman to
frame the interests of women of color will be lacking because white women lack necessary
knowledge of the situations of other women. Thus, universal claims that are supposed to be
authoritative for all women will not be able to appropriately represent all women’s experiences
and interests, nor will they be able to prescribe that women ought to behave a certain way or
have particular interests.

13

III. The Problems of Essentialism and the Possibility of a Concept of Woman
Thus far, I have looked at the problems a concept of woman has in finding a feature or
experience that all women share. I have used the term “women” to loosely correspond to
persons who are females. As the Overlooking and Authority problems indicate, framing a
concept of woman in this way is inadequate. This section will explore how feminists can posit a
concept of woman that does not commit the Overlooking and Authority problems.
Overcoming the Overlooking problem does not seem too difficult. If the problem is
simply that white women have ignored other women, then white women need to step back and
allow more voices to speak about women's oppression. Furthermore, women could abstract from
their own circumstances and try to determine what interests they would have if they were in the
position of different groups of women. In many cases, this sort of work is already being done in
feminist theory as a greater diversity of voices participates in the conversation. Feminists are
more aware that experiences among groups of women are different and that feminist theory as a
body of work is enriched (more powerful, more helpful, more accurate) by addressing a larger
range of experiences. On the other hand, the Overlooking problem indicates a lack of unity
among women. Women of various races and economic backgrounds seem to have a difficult
time relating to women outside of their group because their circumstances and interests are
shaped by dissimilar experiences. Or, perhaps a better way of framing the lack of unity problem
is that women have an easier time associating with women with whom they share distinct and
obvious features (e.g., skin color) or similar cultural backgrounds. Sally Haslanger makes a
similar point: such features generally are thought to indicate a commonality in experiences;
however, with such diversity among women’s experiences, locating commonalities among

14

groups of women may seem extremely difficult.14
If there are interests common to all women and if the Overlooking problem consists in
some women’s interests being ignored, then it is not logically impossible for there to be an
account of interests that all women share as women, despite diversity among them. A
representative concept would need to describe multiple groups of women without overlooking a
particular group, and it should identify the feature or experience common to all women (I will
present my specific account of a concept of woman on pages 17-22). Conversely, some
feminists believe that there are significant differences among women that prevent them from
having any shared interests, and thus a concept of woman that explains the interests women have
as women cannot be given. Moreover, some women may decide, given the great diversity
among women, groups of women should adopt a separatist-type attitude in which smaller groups
of women focus on the interests of their particular group (e.g., Hispanic women focus on
theorizing for only Hispanic women).
Women may have two distinct concerns that lead them to a separatist-type solution.
First, as mentioned earlier, it may be the case that there are no interests that all women share.
Or, secondly, women inclined toward the separatist approach may believe the Overlooking
problem results because different groups of women lack the ability to relate to each other and to
share common experiences in a way that is epistemologically useful for formulating feminist
political theory. According to this type of view, it would be epistemically difficult for women to
talk about any shared experiences, and therefore feminists would be better off theoretically and
politically dealing with more restricted groups of women (e.g., black women focus on black
women) in which members have greater epistemic access to shared experiences than work with a

14

Haslanger, "Gender and Race," 45.
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concept of woman.
This latter solution also alludes to difficulties raised by the Authority problem. As stated
before, the Authority problem is more complex than the Overlooking problem because it
questions whether various groups of women have the authority to make normative claims about
what constitutes a proper understanding of woman and what women’s interests should be. Even
if white women try to understand the experiences of black women, speaking for them will still be
problematic. Instead, marginalized women need to speak in a voice of their own. According to
Lugones and Spelman, women of color need a “non-coerced space” in order to theorize.15
Similarly, hooks asserts that feminist theory must come from a broad base, especially since
different groups of women have unique perspectives to contribute to feminist theory.16 In
formulating a concept of woman, a broad base would help avoid the Overlooking problem. If a
more diverse group of women participate in creating feminist theory, then it is less likely that the
interests of some women will be overlooked.
Moreover, a broad base will help avoid the Authority problem because, in the presence of
great diversity of voices, people are more sensitive to differences and it is more difficult for one
group of women to make authoritative claims that purport to represent the entire group. An
authority problem arises with what Lugones and Spelman term “one-sided dialogue.”17 There is
no apparent reason why a group should believe an account given by someone outside the group
when the group members have no role in the conversation, and there is also a worry that the
outsider’s account will negatively influence the way an insider views herself, her judgments, and
her experiences. Lugones and Spelman worry that women of color will take white women’s
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claims about them as normative. While it is possible for an outsider to make objective claims
about or justifiably criticize a group, outsiders should give some deference to groups when it
comes to the interpretation of their experiences and interests. The problem with one-sided
dialogue is not centered primarily in the accuracy of the outsider’s claims but in the lack of
participation in the supposed conversation by the insiders—they have no voice to respond to the
outsider or to relate their own stories. Instead of one-sided dialogue and assimilation, Lugones
and Spelman argue that women need genuine dialogue founded on friendship and trust in order
to incorporate diverse experiences and to create theory that will be meaningful to multiple groups
of women.18
The ideas presented in the prior two paragraphs go far in ridding feminist theory of
problematic and essentialist claims, both in conjunction with the Overlooking and the Authority
problems. However, these solutions do not really address how feminists might specifically
approach a concept of woman. The previous approach, to identify shared features or experiences
among females, was inadequate. It ignored the different aspects of women’s identities and the
complex relationship between those aspects, which makes it challenging to formulate a
representative concept of woman. Women disagree about what womanhood is—what defines it,
and what it feels like. In the midst of such diversity, it is difficult to see whether different groups
of women have an equivalent, or even a similar, idea of what it means to “be a woman.”
Distinctive experiences and characteristics shape womanhood for each woman, and it seems
impossible to pinpoint a family of particular things that identifies what a woman is.
One reason why identifying a feature that all women share is extremely difficult is that
women have complex intersecting identities. Although the issue of intersecting identities
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warrants a more extensive discussion of its own, I mention it because it helps explain why the
essentialism critique gains so much traction. A Hispanic woman cannot separate her
“womanhood” from other aspects of her identity. What it means for a Hispanic woman to be a
woman is intertwined with ethnic, cultural, and economic influences. Her womanhood is not
prior to her other identities in that it came first or regulates the other identities, nor are her other
identities less important or less influential than her gender. In Spelman’s words, “Selves are not
made up of separable units of identity strung together to constitute a whole person.”19 Since
various aspects of one’s identity resemble a web rather than a stack of blocks, talking about
women as women seems to be a tangled issue. To give a better concept of woman, we need to
frame the situation differently than the previous attempt.
According to Spelman, “Being a ‘woman’ is not the same thing as, or reducible to, being
a ‘female.’ ‘Women’ are what females of the human species become, or are supposed to
become, through learning how to think, act, and live in certain ways.”20 Part of this quote
touches on issues raised in the prior paragraph, but it also points toward the social construction
of women. Females have not just evolved a certain way, but they have been taught to be a
certain kind of being. Although females are viewed as having certain key physical features,
those features do not make someone a woman. To be a woman is to occupy a certain sort of
social position—“woman” is juxtaposed with “men” and other social categories and constructed
by the society and culture in which one lives. Instead of looking only at females, the social
construction of gender will provide a better starting point for formulating a concept of woman.
If we take other identities to be at the least partially constructed, then the two challenges
merge; not only are we dealing with an individual occupying one social position (gender), we are
19
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talking about an individual occupying multiple and overlapping social positions, such as gender
and race. While this combination seems to complicate talking about women, it has the potential
to be very powerful for theory. If gender is constructed, then we can target specific issues that
affect how individuals function as women. The following definition from Haslanger may clarify
the point: if a person has or is perceived to have certain features associated with female
reproduction; if these features relegate the person to a subordinate social position; if the previous
two conditionals factor into the person’s systematic subordination, then the person functions as a
woman.21 Like Haslanger, I see specific features and social positions as constituting a person’s
oppression. However, a person may manifest other features that cause her to be relegated to a
different yet likewise subordinate position. These different features are not mutually exclusive
of identity categories; hence other identities may influence gender. Despite the interconnected
nature of a person’s various identities, specific institutions will particularly focus on what it
means to be a woman because they associate a social position with certain features.
In their discussions of what a woman is, Lugones, Spelman, and hooks seem to imply the
following questions: "Why talk about women? What is the usefulness in a project like that?"
The answer to these questions hints to how feminists could use a concept of woman to achieve
gender equality. The task shifts from a project that attempts to identify women in the world to
one that attempts to identify why and how it is useful to talk about women. Haslanger states that
this sort of method does not attempt to "explicate our ordinary concepts; nor is it [used] to
investigate the kind that we may or may not be tracking with our everyday conceptual analysis;
instead we begin by considering more fully the pragmatics of our talk employing the terms in
question. . . . What cognitive or practical task do they (or should they) enable us to
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accomplish?"22 The Overlooking and Authority problems emphasize problems feminists
encounter when restricting the concept of woman to “ordinary concepts.” To me, it seems much
simpler to think about "birds" or "homo sapiens" and say fairly definitively what beings are
included in the extension of those terms because of essential physical traits, but it is arguably
much more complicated (perhaps impossible) to do so for women. With birds or homo sapiens,
classification seems much more biologically or physiologically based. Sure, some birds cannot
fly, but all birds have wings—there is some ostensible feature or anatomical indicator that people
can point to. To give an analogous description of women seems more difficult because there are
more considerations than just physiology or biology. With women, multiple social contexts
shape the significance of ostensible physiological features. For a brief example, consider gender
identity disorder or transsexualism—that we have disorders and classifications like these two
demonstrates the problematic method of mapping gender identifications onto physiology.
The second part of Haslanger’s statement insinuates the direction my account will take.
As she points out, theorists are able to give a different sort of description of what a woman is.
Feminists have a specific goal—ending gender oppression. Instead of framing the concept of
woman in terms and meanings typical of an ordinary language user, a feminist might, as
Haslanger suggests, think about what she wants a concept of woman to accomplish. One goal of
feminism is promoting gender equality, but for men and women to be equal, the sources of
women’s oppression must be uncovered and overthrown. I view my project as fitting in this
juncture. Because oppression is perpetrated by social institutions, if feminists can formulate a
concept of woman that stems from the construction of woman as beings in the service of men,
the concept will be able to be politically useful in getting rid of or changing those institutions. I
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propose this sort of concept of woman—one that views how social institutions have created
women as being entities that serve men, entities that are and should be sexually available to men.
In

talking about how women are oppressed as women through the regulation of their

sexuality, it may be useful to discuss what sort of referents fit into this concept. What sort of
actual beings are oppressed as women? Haslanger provides an interesting discussion on this
point, and I use her definition as part of my concept. In her terminology, women have been
discursively constructed “to a significant extent . . . because of what [feature or experience] is
attributed to it [women] or how it [women] is classified.”23 Thus, women are beings that have
the features attributed to women by patriarchal institutions, and these attributes shape how
women function in society. A woman’s social functioning will also shape how a woman views
herself. This definition leaves open the possibility that a male may be a woman if he is
perceived as having woman’s features and is classified accordingly.
What, then, will a concept of woman that would be politically useful need to address to
be successful? Because it indicates the features all women share, the concept should say
something representative of and meaningful about every member of the class term woman. The
concept will help explain one way in which women experience oppression, namely through how
they are constructed by patriarchal institutions.24 Even though we are not concerned with a
concept that simply identifies objects in the world, the concept should accurately correspond to
the experiences of women and capture what interests women have as women. Before a concept
can be useful to us, it must make sense in light of the events we experience.
In addition, it is possible that a woman will not function socially as a woman in each
instance of her life. Because of this possibility, Haslanger argues that a successful concept of
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gender should be "compatible with the idea that (at least for some of us) one's gender may not be
entirely stable, and that other systems of oppression may disrupt gender in particular contexts."25
I agree with Haslanger’s point, and I will further discuss this view and how it relates to the
concept of woman in the next chapter, especially in how the instability of gender is developed in
Judith Butler’s philosophy. Moreover, the second condition may help explain why some women
do not feel they are oppressed because they are privileged in other respects, such as by being
white or wealthy.
Third, to be successful, a concept cannot suffer from the Overlooking or Authority
problems. With these problems in mind, an adequate concept will attempt to address the
situations of all women, but it will not give a particular group of women normative power to
speak for all women. It should not discount the autonomy of women, and it should aid in
empowering them against oppression.26 Moreover, it will not privilege gender above other
identities one may have, although I will specifically focus on gender.
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Chapter Three: Rejecting a Postmodernist Approach
Some feminists will question whether giving a concept of woman is useful. Along these
lines, hooks makes the ominous claim that “there is much evidence substantiating the reality that
race and class identity creates differences in quality of life, social status, and lifestyle that takes
precedence over the common experiences women share—differences which are rarely
transcended.”27 There seems to be some sense in which women are inevitably divided and
despite efforts to understand one another, women will always be fragmented into smaller groups.
When hooks claims that women will not be able to transcend their stark differences, she means
that whatever commonalities are shared will not be enough to overcome the differences women
have in their respective situations. For example, I may be able to share some sort of common
experiences with a woman who has not received an education past the eighth grade, but the
divergences in our situations will present an epistemic barrier that cannot be overcome. This
barrier hearkens back to Lugones and Spelman’s claim that complete understanding between
women is impossible, but these worries do not show that a concept of woman is impossible,
although certainly there are particular challenges in formulating what an account looks like.
Some epistemic barriers will prevent women from overcoming some of their differences. As I
white woman, I cannot have first person access to what it is like to be black; however, some
experiences will affect me as a white woman that will also affect a black woman because we are
both women, and thus an account of women’s interests is still possible.
Nevertheless, if categories are always exclusionary, then feminist theory seems to be left
with bleak options. In celebrating the differences between various groups of women, are women
doomed to admit that really there is no viable way of talking about women as women? Must
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women splinter into groups so that black women deal solely with black women’s experiences
and interests while white women deal with white women’s experiences and interests? If so, it
does not seem legitimate to theorize about women at all.
To respond to these legitimate claims, feminists have, broadly speaking, two options.
One option, which I proposed in the previous chapter, is to understand the concept of woman in
terms of how patriarchal institutions regulate and exploit female sexuality. All women, no
matter what race, social class, or sexual orientation individual women belong to, are affected by
the regulation of female sexuality. On the other hand, feminists may take a postmodernist
approach and abandon understanding women’s oppression and women’s concerns in a way that
represents the interests women have because they are women. I find this approach
unsatisfactory, namely because the postmodernist approach is incapable of making strong
enough social critiques. In this section I will demonstrate why postmodernism fails as the best
approach to understanding women because it cannot give a concept of woman, a concept which
is vital for feminism and the eradication of gender oppression. Furthermore, although I
ultimately reject a postmodernist approach, I will highlight ways in which postmodernism makes
positive suggestions for feminist methodology in formulating a concept of woman.
To feminists like Judith Butler, the idea of a concept of woman is logically exclusionary
and limited so that any attempt at representing all women will be inadequate. Nancy Fraser
describes a view like Butler’s as arguing that identity terms, like “woman,” are exclusionary
because “they are constructed only through the repression of difference.”28 In attempts to give a
concept that represents all women, important differences between women will be glossed over.
However, glossing over important differences results in certain persons (that we want to include
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in the term) being left out. One could apply this problem to Friedan’s work: in trying to give a
concept of woman, Friedan glossed over differences in economic class; however, some women
were not described by her formulation of the concept because of their economic status. No
matter how specific one tries to be, some women will always be outside of the extension of the
concept of woman because they will not meet the necessary requirements for inclusion.
According to Butler, “The premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a
seamless category29 of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category.
These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that
construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes.”30 On
Butler’s view, no matter how a concept of woman is formulated, there will always be someone
who does not meet the given criteria for what a woman is. For any universal formulation, some
women will not count as women based on the criteria presented; thus, any attempt to give a
stable concept, no matter how broad the conception, will not capture the complete group of
members (that we want to include) in the extension of a concept of woman. In the remainder of
this section, I will further explain the position that a fixed concept will always exclude members
of the class term and why implications of this view pose problems for grounding a feminist
critique of patriarchal institutions.
Generally speaking, postmodernism is suspicious of grand, historical narratives that
represent all people.31 Any attempt to formulate a concept of woman will be misguided. In
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addition, postmodernists distrust universal claims about the state of humans. According to
postmodernists there does not seem to be any original state of human nature.32 Even concepts
that seem to be organized naturally are laden with cultural baggage. For instance, feminists often
distinguish between a person’s biological sex and the social construction of gender. However, as
Butler indicates, sex is a gendered concept in that it is organized around heterosexual
reproduction (much like patriarchal conceptions of woman).33 Butler suggests that the history of
sex will confuse its status as a natural category. The features of sex which seem most obvious to
us, namely certain physiological parts, have been classified in a politically significant way.
Females are beings that are penetrated by the male phallus and birth children, and males are the
beings that have power, for instance, to impregnate females. Even the predicates that classify the
so-called natural categories of male and female seem loaded with political implications, which
also seem to presuppose or mirror concepts of gender.34 Sex seems to be just as constructed as
gender does. Social notions of gender help define social understandings of sex, but this seems to
counter the idea that sex is a foundational, natural category. Instead, the definitions are
interconnected. If categories such as sex, which many people take to be basic, are suspect, then
all claims about nature seem suspect as well. People often take certain categories as being
natural rather than constructed, but on a postmodernist reading this view naively ignores the
ways social constructions seem to be, in some manner, prior to the natural definitions that people
posit.
For Butler, gender concepts are unstable and have no fixed meaning, and feminists
should not try to give gender concepts a stable meaning. When a feminist tries to formulate a
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fixed meaning, reading fixed meaning as necessary requirements for inclusion into a concept, the
meaning will be undermined by someone’s experiences that do not obviously fit into the concept.
This exclusion indicates the impossibility of formulating a coherent and stable concept of
woman, but Butler argues that instability is a positive feature of concepts. Butler’s main
argument is hinted at in the following way, “The assumption of its [gender concepts, specifically,
the concept of woman] essential incompleteness permits that category to serve as a permanently
available site of contested meanings. The definitional incompleteness of the category might then
serve as a normative ideal relieved of coercive force.”35 Butler begins with the inability of a
concept to appropriately represent all the entities it purports to describe and argues that what
follows from theorists’ inability to give representative concepts is politically powerful. First,
because gender by its nature does not have any apparently inherent characteristics, the meaning
of a particular gender concept cannot be captured by a concept with a fixed meaning. Because
the concept cannot provide completeness in its representation, its meaning will fluctuate
according to various experiences. Postmodernists are often suspicious of binary oppositions that
force people to comply with only one of two options. Butler disagrees with positing concepts of
“homosexuality” and “heterosexuality” because they constitute a false dichotomy, for instance,
by not allowing for “homosexual” aspects of desire to partly structure a “heterosexual”
experience.36 Moreover, the men/women binary is oppressive in that it seeks to make
heterosexuality socially compulsive. However, because what it means to be a woman is not
fixed, then the instability of the concept serves as resistance against patriarchal oppression; the
concept cannot simply mean what it has traditionally been portrayed as meaning.
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Even though Butler argues against binary categories such as homosexuality and
heterosexuality, she also questions any purportedly stable concept. Butler worries that any
category, especially one concerning identity, that rejects or tries to transcend the norms affirmed
by other categories will develop exclusive norms of its own—it will be just as exclusive as the
categories which it tried to surpass.37 She argues, “Identity categories tend to be instruments of
regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the
rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression.”38 Butler identifies two
particular sorts of categories as being problematic: “normalizing categories of oppressive
structures” and “rallying points for a liberatory contestation of oppression.” The first disjunct in
her claim refers to the coercive nature of binaries as discussed in the previous paragraph. With
the second disjunct, Butler worries that any concept of woman formulated by feminists, even one
posited for reasons of ending gender oppression, will function just as the oppressive construction
does.
Like Butler, I am concerned that “normalizing” concepts are harmful to women and
function as a tool used to regulate behavior and identity. However, concepts as rallying points
for liberation are not necessarily regulative; they can be predominantly descriptive of a certain
issue (gender oppression, for our purposes) without prescribing that certain essential features or
experiences continue to characterize individuals’ experiences in all circumstances and time
periods. Fraser highlights the singular focus on ontology as being the flaw of this type of
approach: “Deconstructionist antiessentialists . . . do not ask, in contrast, how a given identity or
difference is related to social relations of inequality.”39 To hearken back to Frye’s birdcage
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image, postmodernists do not always put enough focus on the way in which the wires of the
birdcage are interconnected to form a cage of oppression. Thus, one way a concept may avoid
essentialism is by focusing on social influences rather than the ontology of the members of the
extension. What may be common or shared between all members of the class is their social
position, not physical or mental characteristics.
Postmodernists tend to be very concerned with language and how language structures
social concepts, and as a result of the construction of concepts, how it structures actual beings.
In Jane Flax’s words, “Man is a social, historical, or linguistic artifact, not a noumenal or
transcendental Being.”40 As Flax indicates, postmodernists are particularly interested in the
linguistic situation of gender; Butler’s entire project of Gender Trouble illustrates a profound
concern with language’s relationship to (our understanding of) society, epistemology, and
metaphysics.41 Like Fraser, Catharine MacKinnon attacks postmodern feminists for ignoring
the social facts of oppression.42 Oppression may be manifested in different ways for various
cultures, but observation supports the claim that women across cultures are subordinated to men.
For being concerned with the construction of identity, it seems odd that postmodernists will
abstract from social facts of oppression (such as rape), but abstracting from social facts will not
change the social institutions that oppress women. On my reading, Butler is concerned with a
different confusion about gender than I am. She is worried about how language constructs
subjects as being a certain way, and because of her linguistic concerns she focuses less on social
institutions.
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Unlike Butler, I am more concerned with how certain social institutions construct women
as being in the service of men. Since the principal concerns of my approach differ from Butler’s,
our accounts may not be equivalently useful for the same sorts of goals. Although linguistic
concerns are legitimate, language is not the only form of patriarchal oppression women
experience, nor would I argue that linguistic concerns are the most politically relevant for
women in our contemporary society. Despite problems with language, patriarchal oppression
affects women in more overtly physical ways—such as the fear of rape and sexual harassment.
Women are not just concerned with their status as subjects but with their safety as well.
MacKinnon argues, “When feminism makes its ‘women’ from the ground up, out of
particularities, from practice, rather than from the top down, out of abstractions and prior theory,
the so-called essentialism cannot occur.”43 MacKinnon indicates that it is possible for a
feminist’s reference to representative claims about all women not be what postmodernists seem
to target in their attacks on universal claims. MacKinnon’s point holds true for my account,
which looks at the situations of women (using the ordinary language aspect of the word) and
connects the dots between them in order to better understand what gender is as a patriarchal
social construction and how feminism can use it. My approach does not posit a special feature
and attempt to mold women accordingly, nor does it start from an ideal woman and define the
members of the extension of women based on the ideal.
Despite postmodernism’s inability to provide a solid foundation for feminist social
criticism, some of its tenets should not be completely ignored. If gender categories always have
instable contents, then we have reason to worry that a concept of woman cannot be formulated in
firm enough grounds to attack the social institutions that create problematic notions of what it
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means to be a woman. To some extent, feminists should pay attention to and perhaps appropriate
certain aspects of postmodernism’s cultural critique. The most notable point which feminists
should be concerned with is the fluidity of gender, both as a concept and as an identity (the
discussion of Haslanger in the previous chapter incorporated this idea). Postmodernists claim
that no feature characterizes all women across time and cultures. In other words, people’s
experiences will always undermine attempts to give a concept a fixed meaning. I agree that there
is no necessary feature or experience (for instance, oppression or reproduction) that defines what
a woman should be. However, history seems fairly consistent in representing the situations of
women, across time and cultures, as being in the service as men. While I want to say that this
fact, and I believe it is not a misnomer to call it a fact, is not one that must define women for all
time, it has thus far accurately described women throughout time. Postmodernism’s failure to
recognize this aspect of women’s history and lives constitutes a weakness that I believe is fatal to
the adequacy their social project.
That being said, an adequate concept of woman should be loose enough to allow for a
variety of experiences and a change in experiences in addition to appropriately reflecting
women’s experiences. Butler is often troubled by how to formulate a “lesbian” or “gay” identity
that not only reflects the experiences of marginalized sexual orientations but also remains
fluctuating as to not force members of the identity group to behave or feel in a particular, fixed
manner. The same point should also hold for a concept of woman. I am not asserting that
women must act in a certain way in order to count as women. Instead, I focus on the ways in
which women have been oppressed as women, how women have been problematically unable to
speak and to act, and how these absences have been created and fostered by patriarchal
institutions.
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With the postmodern-influenced idea of the impossibility of fixed, rigid concepts, a
concept of woman is much more capable of addressing the suspect way in which social
institutions construct gender than the postmodernist conception of instability and subversion.
Unlike postmodernists, I believe that having a concept of woman mean something concrete is
philosophically important and politically useful. Yes, it will not be a rigidly fixed signifier that
holds for all time, but it will capture aspects of women’s experiences that are shared across
economic, racial, and sexual orientation lines. The danger with postmodernism is that gender
identity will be destabilized to the extent that it does not seem fruitful to talk about the positive
aspects of solidarity in relation to a gender category. My account is more capable of grounding
social critique because it allows women to organize around specific ways that social institutions
seek to regulate their behaviors. Once women understand the location of the oppression, they
can work to change it. Moreover, understanding a concept of woman in this way does not force
women to compartmentalize or ignore other aspects of their identities, as was often the case with
previous attempts to formulate a concept of the interests women have because they are women.
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Chapter Four: Toward a Concept of Woman
I. The Structure of Oppression
hooks argues that the phrase “common oppression” stems from race and class privilege—
middle class white women have talked about their interests as developing out of a common
oppression in attempts to convince women of color that the interests of white women were ones
all women should affirm. According to hooks, white women’s “isolation from women of other
class and race groups provided no immediate comparative base by which to test their
assumptions of common oppression.”44 Certainly hooks's concern about the formulation of a
"common" oppression is warranted, but feminists have a way to talk about common oppression
without making problematic authoritative claims. A concept of woman is possible because
women do have a "comparative base" from which they can theorize. As Frye states, “There is a
woman’s place, a sector, which is inhabited by women of all classes and races, and is not
defined by geographical boundaries but by function. The function is the service of men and
men’s interests as men define them.”45 In particular, I refer to the function of women as the
social position women hold viewed through the lens of the systematic regulation of women's
sexuality by patriarchal structures such as rape, pornography, and sexual harassment. Although
women are oppressed as women in other ways as well, such as being relegated to be the primary
caregiver to dependents, I will focus on women’s place in the service of men’s sexual desires.
At this point, when I use the term “women” I do not refer to females but to those who occupy a
specific social position.
By oppression I mean the systematic disadvantage suffered by individuals insofar as they
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are members of certain groups.46 The discrimination is structural and systematic in that it is
rooted in cultural practices and norms. While one group is privileged or advantaged in some
respect, another group(s) is disadvantaged. As Iris M. Young points out, oppression in its
contemporary manifestations is not necessarily the intentional result of a single individual’s
actions and agendas. Rather, oppression’s causes “are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits,
and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of
following those rules.”47 Because individuals are members of a particular group, or because they
are perceived to be members, they are candidates to be disadvantaged according to how that
group is viewed. Young develops five specific categories that explain various ways in which a
group of people may be oppressed: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural
imperialism, and violence.48
One specific problem members of oppressed groups typically face is an absence of
meaningful choices.49 What makes a choice genuine is about the quality of the choice and not
necessarily the quantity of choices that are available. Oftentimes women are confronted with
situations in which they lose no matter what choice they make. Every outcome is an
unacceptable option. These types of choices do not count as genuine because the agent’s choices
do not have any satisfactory outcomes—all of the results are problematic, though perhaps for
different reasons. Frye describes the absence of adequate choices as “the double bind.” She
states, “Women are caught like this, too, by networks of forces and barriers that expose one to
penalty, loss, or contempt whether one works outside the home or not, is on welfare or not, bears
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children, or not,”50 and the list continues. Frye does not develop her examples in detail, but her
point is clear—the choices women have are not genuine choices because all options result in the
woman being blamed, viewed in some negative fashion. Consider the following example of an
oppressive double bind: If I choose to have a career instead of children, I am power hungry. If I
choose to have children instead of a career, I am giving up on my potential. If I choose to have a
career and children, I’m a bad mother because I do not put my children as my first priority.
Although my choices will have dissimilar consequences, each results in me being judged
negatively by social norms.
As illustrated by double binds, patriarchal institutions shape women’s choices such that
the choices cannot be meaningful in certain situations. When a group of people is oppressed,
they are disadvantaged in a number of possible ways, and being restricted from having options is
one of those ways. Oppression can force certain kinds of behaviors because the oppressed do not
have meaningful choices to do otherwise as a result of their systematic subordination. In
particular, patriarchal institutions oppress women by regulating women’s sexuality in two ways.
First, the institutions perpetrate a view of women as subordinate to men. Second, the structures
regulate women's sexuality by forcing certain behavioral norms. These institutions oppress
women as women; no racial group, economic class, or other aspect of one's identity will make
one exempt from them.
a. Rape
Claudia Card’s discussion of rape as a terrorist institution provides one example of how
rape, as a patriarchal institution, oppresses women as women. According to Card, rape
exemplifies a lack of choices: “Women successfully terrorized, and others socialized by them,
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comply with men’s demands.”51 MacKinnon’s language about rape and its social context is even
stronger: as an institution, “rape with legal impunity makes women second-class citizens.”52
Card emphasizes that the social meaning of “consent” in sexual relationships is not really about
choices but about choosing the least intolerable option available.53 By presenting women with a
lack of choices, rape and the threat of rape restricts them from certain possibilities for action and
do not allow them a way to deny consent.
According to Card, rape as a social institution attempts to socialize two types of women,
both the victims of the actual physical assault and “those to whom the message is sent by way of
treatment of the [victims of the physical assault],”54 women who are not physical victims but
who should still conform to certain behavioral standards. Rape is a terrifying example of
institutionalized oppression because of its wide-sweeping threat to all women. Insofar as a
person is viewed socially as a woman,55 she is threatened by rape, regardless of aspects of her
identity that may typically indicate a greater social privilege. Rape occurs in poorer
neighborhoods and wealthier neighborhoods, and it is committed by strangers and people who
are acquaintances of the victims.
Furthermore, rape targets more than the physical victims of sexual assault. Rape
regulates women’s sexuality in that, as an institution, it instructs all women to act in certain
ways. Card lists several “rules” of rape that shape women’s behavior and social perspectives on
sexuality in an oppressive manner (some of the rules apply to other patriarchal institutions as
well). She frames these rules in conjunction with the social definition of what constitutes
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“consent” in a sexual relationship and argues that “the rules [of rape] give the woman’s status
itself the value of consent.”56 Based on the rules (we could also call them myths and false
generalizations), women’s sexuality is controlled. Women are taught that the rules are normative
for their behavior, and thus the rules force women to comply with behavior norms that place
them in a subordinate role to men. These rules can be summarized in three broad categories: (1)
consent, once given, cannot be withdrawn,57 (2) women are to blame for their rapes, and (3) a
woman’s “no” really means “yes.”58
Acquaintance rape, which is loosely defined as “nonconsensual sex between adults who
know each other”59 and includes spousal rape and date rape, exemplifies how the rules shape
social understandings of rape. According to Martha Burt, “More than half of all rapes are
committed by someone known to the victim; most do no involve a weapon, or injury beyond
minor bruises and scratches; most occur indoors, in either the victim or the assailant’s home
(Ageton, 1983; Amir, 1971; Burgess and Holmstrom, 1979; Koss, 1985; MacDonald, 1979;
Russell, 1984; Warshaw, 1988).60 In addition to acquaintance rape accounting for most rapes,
Laurie Bechhofer and Andrea Parrot state that “it is estimated that less than one percent of
acquaintance rape victims report the crime to the police (Burkhart, 1983).”61 I purposefully
discuss acquaintance rape for reasons illustrated by the previous two quotes: first, acquaintance
accounts for the majority of rapes, and second, it counters the scenario of a dark alley and
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masked stranger that comes to mind when many people think of rape.
Like Card, Burt sees rules, or “myths” in Burt’s language, as promoting false views about
rape. One rule of rape is that consent, once it is given, cannot be withdrawn. This rule maintains
that consent may be given to one person but extend to another, or it could be given to a person in
one situation and extend to all situations involving that same person. According to Burt, “This is
the type of myth that traps many minority women, whose experiences of sexual violation are not
taken seriously because they are stereotyped as sleeping with many men and therefore already
devalued.”62 Burt includes divorced women and prostitutes in the list of sexually promiscuous
women, but other groups of women could be included as stereotypically sexually active women,
such as members of college sororities. In addition to divorced women, MacKinnon includes
wives because wives are viewed as sexual active beings simply in virtue of their being married.63
According to this rape rule, these types of women consent to sex in many instances. MacKinnon
describes them as “unrapable” from the man’s point of view because they are perceived as being
whorish.64 Thus, when they have been raped, they are less likely to be believed. Their prior
consent, or at least what was perceived as prior consent, is seen to extend to all situations in
which they engage in sexual activities.
Another rule of rape is that women are to blame for their rapes. Bechhofer and Parrot
emphasize that this myth seems especially true for instances of acquaintance rape.65 As
mentioned earlier, most instances of acquaintance rape occur in the home of the victim or of the
rapist. The victim and the rapist may have been drinking at a bar together or engaged in what
seems to be a common social activity, such as going to dinner or to a movie. In the midst of
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these seemingly usual circumstances, it seems odd to many people that something that seems less
usual, rape, could occur. The woman must be at fault; she must have been talking too
flirtatiously, dressed too provocatively, or drinking too much. As Burt notes, “the myths do not
differentiate between her [the victim] ‘asking for’ companionship, friendship, and a date and her
‘asking for’ rape.”66 Rape rules portray the rapist as having no measure of responsibility for the
rape because the victim is the person who acted incorrectly in some manner.
Likewise, a third rule of rape rejects that the rapist is responsible for the crime because
when a woman refuses sex, she really means she wants it. Her “no” actually means “yes.” This
rule is also closely related to the first rule, that consent cannot be withdrawn. If a woman has
had sex before, she is seen as necessarily wanting it again. Her other actions, like dancing with a
date, indicate that she is really saying “yes” to sex even if she verbally refuses or physically
resists. However, as Bechhofer and Parrot assert, “For a person to give consent in a sexual
situation, legally and morally, she or he must say ‘yes’ and not say ‘no.’ Consent must be
obtained on every separate occasion and cannot be assumed from previous interactions.”67
Although I cannot address whether sexual consent requires an explicit yes on every occasion as
Bechhofer and Parrot imply, at the very least, if a person resists sexual advances, verbally or
physically, she has not given consent, despite whatever signs someone has perceived the
individual as sending.
Burt and Card argue that these rules strip consent away from women. In conjunction
with acquaintance rape, Burt asserts, “Rape myths . . . transform rape by an acquaintance,
friends, and intimates into no rape at all.”68 Similarly, Card argues, “Women unable to withhold
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consent are also unable to give it.”69 Note that Card’s claim is not empirical, but political. She
does not claim that women never have consensual sex; rather, she emphasizes the political power
that women lack. If rape and sexual norms discount women’s agency and dictate that all
behavior is really consent, then what grounds are left to constitute a woman’s ability to deny
consent? MacKinnon pushes further, commenting on the foundations of the consent problem.
According to MacKinnon, even if women did have a viable way in which to deny consent, the
structure of consent between men and women is unequal. Although consent is meant to be the
woman’s means of control over her circumstances, the consent scenario begins with the man
instigating sexual engagements. Men have the power to initiate sex, and only after their
initiation are woman given an opportunity to speak. This disparity leads MacKinnon to state,
“Yet the consequences [of rape] are attributed to her as if the sexes began at an arm’s length, on
equal terrain.”70 The lack of equality in the structure of consent indicates that women still make
decisions based on men’s desires. But, even if one does not accept MacKinnon’s stronger claim,
Card’s point still holds. The rules of rape and the sex hierarchy they perpetrate imply that she
has no will and she is just an object that can (acceptably) be used!
Moreover, a woman is not just an object to be violated by rapists71 because the rules of
rape also impose certain stereotypical roles onto women. For instance, women who are alone are
vulnerable to rape; therefore, women should have male protectors to guard them, and as Card
points out, what these “guardians” choose to do sexually to women does not count as rape
because they are protecting women from the big bad rapists in the world.72 Rape is an
inescapable bind in which women’s willpower means nothing. As an institution, rape creates
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and supports the oppressive view that women are objects for men’s pleasure and that women are
in need of male protection. Both men and women internalize this view, which is tremendously
dangerous to women’s development and self-concepts.73
An important claim of this thesis is that a successful account of women’s oppression
should be compatible with the idea that one’s identity may not be stable, which allows for some
females not to function as “women” in every situation in the sense that I am defining the term.
As a result, however, this account allows for beings that an ordinary language user may not
intuitively think of as functioning as woman, such as males, to be a feminized in some
circumstances. Male on male rape provides one example of how non-females may function as
women. This feature of the category of women is not a weakness but a strength. If males can
function as women in certain social situations, the focus of the gender oppression problem as
being with social institutions is further emphasized. Like the rape of women, male on male rape
reinforces the myth that men should have sexual access to whatever they desire, whether the
individual be a female or a male. Male on male rape imposes certain behaviors as appropriate
for men and women. Rus Ervin Funk writes powerfully about how he was gang-raped by three
white men, and although he considers his rape to be an extreme case, he notes that rape sends a
particular message about what it means to “be a man” and what it means to “be a woman”:
The theme of the rape of men is that rape, regardless of the perceived gender of the
victim, is a weapon of male supremacy. . . . Men who are or are perceived to be
effeminate, men of color, men who act up and act out of the prescribed roles of male
supremacy are at a greater risk of being raped, and the threat of rape is extremely
effective in keeping men acting like men.74
As an activist for ending men’s violence against women, children, and other men, Funk
challenges social notions of what it meant to be a man. As a result of working with battered
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victims, Funk notes that his perception on “men’s rights” changed. He relates, “The jokes that
had always been so funny weren’t so funny, the pornography I had always understood as being
entertainment (sic) and my right (sic) became less enjoyable and less of a right. The ways men
interacted with the women in our lives, which had always seemed so appropriate, weren’t.”75
Funk’s rape served as a message to him that he, as a male, was not acting as a man should as
defined by patriarchal standards. His rape attempted to enforce certain behavior codes on him
and it made him into a sex object. His objectification through rape was supposed to reinforce to
Funk that he was acting outside of what it meant to “be a man,” and it sent a message about
patriarchal dominance: men have power and dominance over women.
In addition, it is not a problem for my concept of woman if other identities or if
intersecting identities take an active part in explaining a woman’s rape. For example, a black
woman is raped by a white man. Perhaps the rapist is racist and believes that blacks are inferior
to whites, and thus he has certain beliefs about black women and how black women should be
treated, not just about women. In particular, the rapist targets black women of short stature with
extremely dark skin who have meek temperaments. The woman’s intersecting identities together
explain her being rape, which seems to contradict my claim that rape oppresses women as
women. However, the seeming contradiction is not a problem for my account. Because an
institution oppresses women as women, it does not mean that other identities or factors do not
influence instances of oppression. Moreover, because gender, race, and sexual orientation are
social constructs, multiple aspects of one identity may be constructed together in a certain way.
For example, women are socially constructed beings, but it is also the case that being a black
woman is a construction. Because the black woman is black and is a woman, her rapist views
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her as an object that can be used sexually for his own pleasure. Although other women may not
be black, or short-statured, or meek, women in some way can identify with the fear, hurt, anger,
et cetera the rape victim felt. Unlike some other experiences, the fear of rape means something
to all women. The rape victim’s being a black woman explains why she is raped, but so does the
fact that she is a woman.
Consider the New Mexico Court of Appeals case State v. Johnson.76 This case illustrates
how a woman may be raped because she is a woman although other parts of her identity
contribute to her rape. It also demonstrates the complex nature of determining consent and how
the rules of rape shape how society views rape. In State v. Johnson, the defendant argues that his
rape conviction should be reversed because his (alleged) victims were prostitutes. According to
the defendant, the women charged him with rape because he refused to pay them. Contrary to
the defendant’s allegations, at least one of the victims stated that although she had previously
worked as a prostitute, she was not working as one on the night of the (alleged) rape. However,
the court agreed with the defendant that the victims’ past sexual activity was relevant to the case:
“We believe this evidence would have tended to support Defendant’s claim that the women
agreed to engage in sexual activity with him for money and later alleged that Defendant raped
them because he refused to pay.”77 The sexual history of the victims gave them, in the court’s
eyes, a “motive to fabricate” their rapes.
State v. Johnson illustrates the extent to which victims are blamed (or not believed) for
rapes because of prior sexual consent—even though they consented to sex with other individuals
and not the defendant.78 The following are aspects of the case (I do not call them facts because
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not all parties agree on what happened): (1) The defendant tricked the women into coming with
him to an isolated location by posing as a police office; (2) the defendant coerced the victims
into having sex with him by holding them at knifepoint; and (3) at least one of the victims had
worked as a prostitute on a prior occasion, but not on the night in question. The court decided
that the third aspect of the case might have particular relevance to the sincerity of the alleged
victims and their motive to lie about aspects one and two, but the other aspects lead to interesting
questions that the court did not apparently consider. For instance, MacKinnon poses the
following question:
In what position of power does the ruling in this case [the rape conviction was reversed]
place police officers relative to prostituted women? Why did [the] defendant, if he did,
succeed in picking up these two women who were not then prostituting by telling them
that he was a policeman?79
In State v. Johnson, the defendant viewed the women as being there to fulfill his desires. The
women’s former employment as prostitutes is not equivalent to consent, although it may have
contributed to their being targeted as victims of rape. Despite their genuine lack of consent, in
the eyes of their rapist and in the court, what happened to these women did not count as rape,
even though they had been made into sex objects to be used for a man’s pleasure.
b. Pornography
In a similar way, pornography80 as an institution regulates women's sexuality by
objectifying women and forcing certain behavioral norms. MacKinnon defines a feminist
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perspective of pornography as being "a form of forced sex . . . an institution of sexual politics."81
In the model antipornography ordinance that MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin authored, they
identify harms to women that express two sorts of targets, just as Card identified two targets of
rape.82 Pornography may harm the participants in the production of pornography in a numbers of
ways, including physical abuse and humiliation. In addition, pornography targets all women
insofar as the message creates and contributes to the subordination of women to men. This point
seems particularly true of the message pornography sends to men.
As Dworkin and MacKinnon state, pornography leads to the "lower[ing of] the human
dignity, worth, and civil status of women and damage[s] mutual respect between the sexes; [and]
contribute[s] significantly to restricting women in particular from full exercise of citizenship and
participation in the life of the community.”83 Pornography does not merely depict women as
being second-class citizens—it makes them such. To some people, this may seem like a strong
claim to make; however, pornography represents and constructs an extreme view of women and
their sexuality that negatively affects their status as equal citizens—a view in which women are
treated as being objects that men can purchase and use for sex.84 Furthermore, MacKinnon
argues that pornography "contributes causally to attitudes and behaviors of violence and
discrimination which define the treatment and status of half the population."85 Whether or not
one agrees that pornography functions in a direct causal relationship with other forms of sexual
discrimination, the use of pornography arguably is correlated with other forms of sexual
discrimination because its message, like the message of rape and other institutions, shapes
women into a certain kind of being that exists for men.
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MacKinnon argues pornography is "sexualized objectification,” which “is what defines
women as sexual and as women under male supremacy."86 Pornography contributes to
patriarchal domination by objectifying women. It makes women sex objects—sex objects that
bring (perceived) pleasure to their male counterparts and pleasure to the user. Thus,
pornography perpetrates women’s sexual availability as creatures that satisfy men’s desires.
Moreover, some of the rape rules Card identifies also are rules for pornography, such as a
woman's "no" really means "yes." Women are seen as desiring and needing men to fulfill their
desires, even when women initially seem to refuse consent.87 In MacKinnon's view, "what
pornography says about us [women] is that we enjoy degradation, that we are sexually turned on
by being degraded."88 It is "sexy" to be submissive and to conform to men's desires. Like rape,
pornography negatively socializes women; it makes women into beings who are sex objects for
the service of men; and as a result, women lose their agency.
Not only is pornography harmful to women because of the message it sends them, but it
is also harmful because of the message it sends to men. Pornography is not a fantasy or a
nightmare detached from the actuality of women's lives. It is parasitic on, it intensifies, and it
creates the power hierarchy that embodies our social concept of gender. According the
MacKinnon, "[Gender] has no basis in anything other than the social reality its hegemony
constructs. The process that gives sexuality its male supremacist meaning is therefore the
process through which gender inequality becomes socially real."89 Pornography is one of the
processes that creates the gender hierarchy implicit on our society, along with the norms that
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express women's subordination to men.
Some feminists believe that pornography offers, to use Judith Butler's language, a "highly
erotic promise of transgressing traditional restrictions on women's sexuality.”90 A proponent of
this view may argue that whenever pornography focuses on the woman as "in charge" or on a
same-sex couple, it challenges traditional conceptions of gendered relationships. For instance,
consider a woman as being portrayed in pornography as holding a position of authority over a
man. Before endorsing such pornography, we should question how much authority the woman
actually has. She holds an authoritative position because it serves men's purposes to allow her
it—sex is still defined by men’s interests. Women cannot remove themselves from being objects
that men control, and even in situations in which a woman appears to have control, her perceived
power is regulated by men's authority. If pornography as the production of a good for consumers
is dictated by what sexually gratifies men, then any instance of pornography which seems to
counter this norm is still suspect. This relationship seems to be what MacKinnon is getting at
when she says, "The liberal defense of pornography as human sexual liberation . . . is a defense
not only of force and sexual terrorism, but of the subordination of women."91
What if a pornography company run by homosexuals were to produce erotic media in
celebration of sexual freedom? MacKinnon seems wary of pornography being helped or
changed through transcendence when the issue of men's domination of women is still driving the
industry, but if domination is absent, would the pornography still represent a gendered
hierarchy? This question is difficult to answer. On my account, institutions force certain
behavioral norms on women. However, they also play into, reinforce, and create norms of
women's inferiority. Insofar as the majority of consumers of pornography are men, the industry
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is directed by men's interests and is oppressive to women. Despite the intentions of the
producers, the message may be misconstrued as meaning that women are subordinate to men. If
MacKinnon is right about sex and porn being in some way equivalent, or that pornography
constructs a hierarchal view of what sex is, then most instances of pornography, in our culture at
this time, seem to at least partially contribute to the regulation of women's sexuality. That being
said, a production company ran by homosexuals that focuses on sexual liberation and not sexual
regulation may perhaps offer a promising idea of what society's understanding of gender could
be like in the future.
c. Sexual Harassment
Like rape and pornography, the practice of sexual harassment reinforces the patriarchal
dominance of women by men. It exemplifies the power structure embedded in gender and
demonstrates how men’s experiences define what society typically views as appropriate conduct.
As MacKinnon points out, the sex aspect of sexual harassment has not always been emphasized;
people often see sexual harassment as an abuse of power but not as an abuse of sexuality. People
do not “question whether sexuality, as socially constructed in our society through gender roles, is
itself a power structure.”92 However, sexual harassment as a practice functions to place women
in a power struggle below men—women are supposed to be sexually available to men whenever
men want them to be.
MacKinnon has distinguished between two types of sexual harassment, both of which are
illegal under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The first type, quid pro quo, occurs when
“sex is exchanged, or sought to be exchanged, for a workplace or educational benefit.”93 The
second type, termed hostile environment, occurs “when conditions of work are damagingly
92
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sexualized (or otherwise harmful) on the basis of sex.”94 These conditions could interfere with
the individual’s ability to work, or they could be intimidating or insulting.95 James Gruber
identifies sexual harassment in the workplace as a tool men use to lash out against what they
view as threats to their place of dominance. He states that the hostile environment form of
harassment can be extremely effective in placing women in a subordinate position to men, and in
leading to quid pro quo harassment: “The male traditionality of an occupation creates a work
culture that is an extension of male culture, and numerical dominance of the workplace by men
heightens visibility of, and hostility toward, women workers who are perceived as violating male
territory.”96
To many people, the line between “sexual harassment” and “good-natured, harmless
flirtation” is very fine, much like the line between giving or denying consent in rape cases. This
distinction results from a failure to take what would be reasonable from a reasonable woman’s
perspective as defining what constitutes sexual harassment instead of the norms that are set by
patriarchal definitions. As Elizabeth Anderson notes, there needs to be some objective standard
to determine whether a woman welcomes sexual attention, but objective standards often default
or reduce to patriarchal, men-centered definitions.97 This problem has led some feminists to
posit that the perspective that should be used in determining whether attention is welcome or not
should be that of the “reasonable women.” In describing a “reasonable person” standpoint,
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg states, “It suffices to prove that a reasonable person
subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so
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altered working conditions as to ‘make it more difficult to do the job (Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.).”98 The reasonable woman perspective is analogous to the reasonable person perspective
described by Ginsburg. We abstract from questions of mental health or the background of the
victim and instead ask, would a woman reasonably find the situation in question to be oppressive
and a hindrance to one’s job? If so, then the courts have reason to believe that the event truly
counts as harassment. This perspective is not completely subjective; it adds an element of
objectivity and accounts for a woman’s point of view in deciding what counts as sexual
harassment.99
Other feminists have argued that the law should concentrate on the act of harassment that
occurred. Anderson describes the view as “the proposal to infer unwelcomeness immediately
from facially hostile acts. For sexual advances unaccompanied by overt hostility . . . the test
should focus on the defendant’s regard for the target’s will.”100 Both of these approaches
highlight the problems with finding a somewhat objective standard by which to judge instances
of alleged harassment and still respect the point of view of the victim. These questions are not
easy to answer, and they lay outside the scope of my current project. Nevertheless, they both
agree on one important feature of how sexual harassment has been handled by the legal system
and our society—it has judged women by patriarchal standards. For now, the “reasonable
woman” perspective may be the best we can do, but it is still an attempt not to define sexual
harassment with purely masculine concepts. It is one way in which feminists have tried to
counter the oppressive nature of some sexual harassment laws. How men characterize
oppressive conduct towards women may differ drastically from how women characterize it, and
the reasonable woman perspective seeks to give women some sort of political voice to speak
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about their experiences with sexual harassment. A goal in formulating a concept of woman
through their oppression by patriarchal institutions is to identify interests all women have as
women, and the reasonable woman perspective is a manifestation of one of those interests—a
stronger political voice to speak about women’s experiences.
Consider the following example, which displays the problem of judging unwelcomeness
and the lack of political voice victims have in sexual harassment situations: A couple years ago a
friend called me, distraught about a sexual harassment charge two of his peers in graduate school
were bringing to their dean against him. My friend was devastated—a sexual harassment charge
could damage his graduate career and could impact his future professional career as well. When
he related the story to me, I was stupefied: while driving to lunch one day with these two girls,
my friend made some obscene jokes and asked the girls when and where they liked to be naked.
He said they did not really respond, but they also seemed relatively normal. The sexual
harassment charges threw him completely off guard. After all, he related to me, he was married.
Why would he harass them? Why couldn’t they understand he was just kidding? There are two
significant aspects to this story, both of which concern how the male’s perspective is taken as
definitive: (1) My friend could not see his behavior as an instance of sexual harassment; in his
mind, he was inoffensively joking with girls about their sexuality. (2) The sexual harassment
charge was about what the girls did wrong, not the man—they failed to have a sense of humor.
My friend was concerned with his career and the repercussions of a sexual harassment charge,
but not with the experiences of his classmates and their understanding of what transpired.
Although questions of where the burden lays of proving harassment are indeed fuzzy, my
friend’s situation does illustrate how many people discount the woman’s perspective as
unimportant or irrelevant.
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I do not believe that my friend is alone in failing to acknowledge women’s experiences,
or what a reasonable woman would count, as the standard that defines sexual harassment. The
perpetrator may not consciously realize that his actions subordinate and harm women, but
women’s experiences have been ignored and what counts as acceptable behavior is defined only
by men’s perspectives. Patriarchal institutions and their influences on society do not cultivate a
mind-set that recognizes women’s perspectives. As MacKinnon points out, sexual harassment
acts out the gender hierarchy and silences women’s ability have their own voices:
Whenever—every and any time—a woman feels conflicted and wonder what’s wrong
with her that she can’t decline although she has no inclination, and she feels open to male
accusations, whether they come from women or men, of ‘why didn’t you just tell him to
buzz off?’ we have sold her out, not named her experience. We are taught that we exist
for men.101
Just as pornography makes women into sex objects, sexual harassment makes them into objects
for men’s pleasure. Sexual harassment perpetrates the view that men have control over women
and can treat them however they wish while women lack power to respond. James Gruber
discusses women’s lack of power in sexual harassment cases:
Women’s coping behavior is also affected in sexually tolerant environments: Their
responses to harassment are influenced by their perceptions of the level of risk involved
in complaining about harassment, the likelihood that such complaints will be taken
seriously, and the likelihood that the perpetrators will be punished (Hulin, Fitzgerald, and
Drasgow 1996).102
Gruber’s statement provides support for the claim that women internalize patriarchal norms that
are harmful to them. When practices like sexual harassment continually ignore women’s
experiences and silence their voices, women began to feel and act as if they should be silent.
I have largely drawn from the work MacKinnon did in reforming how the legal system
and society view sexual harassment. However, some people criticize the way her view has been
101
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interpreted by the legal system. My view is able to correct for most of the weak spots people
have identified in MacKinnon’s theory. A brief overview of problems that Anderson identifies
in MacKinnon’s view and the way the law has applied it will be useful to highlight some
strengths of my view. Anderson describes MacKinnon’s work as having “entrenched a paradigm
of sexual harassment as sexual conduct that men impose on women because they are women.”103
Anderson’s depiction of MacKinnon’s position mirrors my own—patriarchal institutions
regulate women’s sexuality by depicting and making them into objects that are defined by men’s
desires. Anderson pinpoints a problem that has arisen from MacKinnon’s view with the kinds of
individuals who have been charging sexual harassment, which include “women who have been
harassed in nonsexual ways; gays, lesbians, and transsexuals who have been harassed in on
account of their sexual orientation and identities, and heterosexual men who have bullied by
other men.”104 This problem results because MacKinnon’s view and its common legal
interpretations seems to have a “narrow focus” that does not allow for some instances of
questionable behavior to count as sexual harassment, even though these behaviors target the
sexuality or gender of victims.105
However, one does not have to see sexual harassment as necessarily having narrow
scope—which is Anderson’s point as well as a main tenet of my proposal. As Anderson notes,
sexual desire may not be explicit in every case of sexual harassment. For instance, she worries
that the pornographic workplace illustrates that some instances of harassment are not obviously
issues of sex discrimination. She states, “The pornographic workplace does not target the
complaitant, although it sexually objectifies members of her sex.”106 This scenario maps onto
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Card’s point about the threat of rape targeting two types of women: the victims who have been
physically assaulted and the women to whom patriarchal norms are meant to apply. The
pornographic workplace can be understood as having as its primary object the second sort of
victim. The message of women being sexually objectified counts as sex discrimination because
it establishes a gendered hierarchy in which the woman is subordinate to the man. However,
insofar as the message of the pornographic workplace targets women, any woman interacting in
the workplace will be a target, and the pornography will be sending a message about how she
should be viewed by herself and her colleagues—a message of subordination and discrimination.
In addition to the pornographic workplace scenario, the 1998 Supreme Court case Onacle
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. raises questions about whether males’ sexual harassment of
other males in the absence of sexual desire can count as sexual harassment for legal purposes.
On my reading it can, because the harassed male is feminized by the act of the harassment, and
the harassment targets him and other women (even if they were not directly present in the
harassment case) by professing that certain behaviors are acceptable for men and certain
behaviors are acceptable for women.
While Onacle worked with seven other men (there were no women present) on an oil
platform, he was “forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him in the
presence of the rest of the crew. [Respondents] Pippen and Lyons also physically assaulted
Onacle in a sexual manner, and Lyons threatened him with rape.”107 In addition, Pippen and
Lyons “held him [Onacle] down while one pressed his penis against his head and arm, and
shoved a bar of soap between the cheeks of his buttocks while he showered.”108 The respondents
were heterosexual; there was no obvious instance of sexual desire motivating the harassment.
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However, on my account, Onacle’s situation can count as an instance of sexual harassment. Like
Funk’s rapists, Pippen and Lyons’ behavior sought to enforce masculine norms, which include
men’s dominance of women, as appropriate behavior. In harassing Onacle, Pippen and Lyons
forced him into the inferior position of a woman, a being sexually available to meet men’s needs.
Anderson describes the meaning behind harassment, in which “H manifests or enforces male
dominance in harassing A,” whether A be male or female, as what constitutes the harassment as
sexual harassment.109 Onacle’s harassment was very much centered on sexuality, and his
harassers' behavior sought to enforce a patriarchal belief about what men’s sexuality should be.
The Onacle case provides support for my thesis in two important ways. First, it provides
further evidence for the claim that the social position of woman extends beyond females.
Second, and more significantly, Onacle demonstrates how males can be feminized—how they
can be made women—which emphasizes that institutions like sexual harassment actually create
gendered hierarchies of power. They do more than enforce an already present reality; they
actually make women into beings that are subordinate to men.
II. What a Concept of Woman Can Accomplish
Understanding certain patriarchal institutions such as pornography and rape as
specifically targeting women as women allows women to come together to work for social
change. A concept of woman framed in this way does not necessitate that women be a certain
way or have a certain intrinsic characteristic or experience.110 Furthermore, understanding
certain issues as women’s issues does not entail that feminist theory only needs to be concerned
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with those issues. Other issues merit attention as well, and the concept of woman I have posited
does not imply that those other concerns do not count. For instance, there are other important
ways in which women are oppressed as women, such as being assigned to be primary caregivers
for children and other dependents. Although the concept given in this paper does not address
those issues, it does give feminists a robust and powerful means to critique patriarchy.
Previously I laid out three conditions that a successful concept of woman should meet,
and I will now show that I have met each condition.111 The explanation for the first condition,
that a concept should have explanatory power, is tied to the explanation for the second condition,
that a concept should recognize that some people’s various identities are not always stable.
Some women claim that they do not feel oppressed, and thus they believe they must not
experience oppression. However, I focus on how women’s sexuality is regulated by social
institutions. The concept helps explain how certain institutions limit women’s abilities to make
choices. Also, the concept makes it possible for a woman not to feel oppressed but still to be
oppressed by an institution insofar as that institution makes normative claims that remove
women’s willpower and limit how women should function in society.
I also argue that the concept of woman I have given does not suffer from the Overlooking
or Authority problems, but someone may question whether I succeed. After all, I am one
feminist (who happens to be white and educated) offering a concept of how to understand how
women are oppression as women. However, I do not view my work as being essentialist and I
am not claiming that feminists should adopt only this concept. I have consciously tried to gather
and understand the experiences of all women. By taking steps to promote conversation, and
hopefully cooperation, among different groups of women about what it means to be a woman
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and how feminism can work toward gender equality, I believe that I have shown how one can
develop a concept of how all women are oppressed in virtue of their social position as women.
While individual experiences will vary, the method of patriarchal dominance is similar for all
women. The concept of woman does not silence women’s voices, but attempts to create a space
for women, no matter what their race or economic status, to speak about against patriarchal
oppression. Moreover, the concept does not posit one sort of feature or particular experience as
constitutive to particular physical beings, and it does not restrict the concept of woman to an
exclusive set of characteristics, thereby leaving out some of the beings that we would want to
include in the concept.112 Rather, I have tried to demonstrate that we can understand what a
woman is by looking at one way in which she functions in society, and by looking at how
oppressive patriarchal institutions force certain standards on women.
One of the criticisms made in relation to the Authority problem concerns the exclusion of
particular groups of women from the process of defining “woman.” Even if a group presents an
accurate representation of “woman,” the project fails if other groups of women are not involved
in the discussion. For example, if a white woman presents a concept of woman that does not
overlook the experiences of non-white women or make a certain characteristic constitutive of
women, but excludes women of color from participating in the process, then the concept would
still be lacking.113 In my formulation of a concept of woman, I have not presumed to have
authority over other groups of women, and I have not tried to make such claims. By drawing
from a diverse group of feminists, my position has not been informed solely by my experiences,
nor do I believe that it only speaks to the experiences of women whose situations are very similar
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to mine. This concept can be affirmed by diverse groups of women and can be useful to feminist
theory and the project of working toward gender equality.
To some feminists, defining the social position of woman against that of men and
patriarchal systems of dominance may seem to be the incorrect strategy. Patriarchal systems
have done numerous harms to women, and feminists may question an account of women given in
relation to those harms. On the other hand, understanding the social position to which women
are relegated by oppressive social structures and practices will help women be able to organize
and work toward political and social change. A concept of woman that focuses on one way in
which women are oppressed as women, such as the one I have proposed, emphasizes the method
of patriarchal dominance over women, but it does not imply that women should accept or
endorse the views as put forth by these institutions. Instead, this concept creates a framework
that feminists can use to ground their social critique of patriarchy by targeting the specific
oppressive institutions and the messages they convey.114 Although I have not carried the project
further than this point, I have laid the groundwork for how feminists can recreate the concept of
woman once problematic social institutions have been debunked.
For example, consider cases in which companies have actively tried to implement
policies against and policies punishing sexual harassment. Gruber’s work with M. Smith
supports the claim that when organizations have strong policies against sexual harassment,
women are more likely to speak out about instances in which they were harassed and against
perpetrators. On their analysis, “women in workplaces with proactive strategies were less likely
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to be physically threatened or to be the targets of offensive sexual comments or questions.”115
Not only do policies empower women to speak out against harassment, but they also help reduce
the number of sexual harassment cases. In addition to his study with Smith, Gruber cites other
cases in which policies have helped reduce the number sexual harassment instances (at least that
were reported). He reports on a Department of Defense study which showed a decrease in sexual
harassment reports in the military from 64 percent in 1988 (the 1988 numbers are based on the
first comprehensive military assessment of sexual harassment) to 55 percent in 1995.116 These
figures seem to suggest that when people recognize the experiences of women and the ways in
which they are oppressed by patriarchal institutions, then people are able to initiate change.
Statistics such as those reported by Gruber should encourage us to understand the social position
of women as I have suggested. Once we understand the oppression, we can begin to undermine
and eradicate it.
As mentioned earlier, many women feel isolated from the feminist movement, and a
frequent response women give to not affirming feminism is that they do not feel oppressed. The
feminist project does not make sense to them in light of their experiences. Feminists have
responses to these claims (e.g., women have internalized their oppression), but the responses do
not always provide the best means of bringing women to feminism. My concept of woman can
speak to women who have not affirmed feminism because the explanation of oppression through
the institutions of rape, pornography, and sexual harassment makes sense to women unfamiliar
with feminists' particular language about oppression. Many women will resonate with the terror
of rape or with the behavior norms that pornography prescribes for women. As a greater number
of women join the feminist movement, feminists' resources will expand, and we will be better
115
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able to fight for gender equality.
Furthermore, the account of women's oppression I have offered is useful for building
sisterhood. Many feminists emphasize the importance of consciousness-raising experiences and
the bonds of sisterhood that result from them. hooks, who writes much on the value of
sisterhood, notes that sisterhood may not be as powerful as it was at the beginning of the
contemporary feminist movement: "Political solidarity between women which had been the force
putting in place positive change has been and is now consistently undermined and threatened.
As a consequence we are as in need of a renewed commitment to political solidarity between
women."117 Understanding some forms of oppression as targeting all women helps promote
sisterhood as a political commitment to end gender oppression and to fight for gender equality.
Given the difficulties women have in connecting across race and class lines, understanding the
oppression all women are subjected to by institutions such as rape and pornography presents a
powerful means women have for connecting in political solidarity. The promotion of sisterhood,
in turn, contributes to the potential political force that this account of women offers.
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